SCOTUS: ICE detention facility contractor couldn't appeal - Missouri Lawyers Media

A company that operates a private detention center for ICE was not entitled to immediate review of a decision denying its motion to dismiss a putative labor class action filed on the ground that U.S. Supreme Court precedent shields federal contractors from suit for actions “authorized and directed” by the government, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled.

The defendant in the case, GEO Group, Inc., operates a private detention facility in Colorado under a contract with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

A former detainee at the Aurora facility filed a class action against the defendant, alleging GEO’s work policies for detainees violate a federal bar on forced labor and Colorado’s prohibition on unjust enrichment.

The defendant moved to dismiss, citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1940 decision Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Company. In Yearsley, the court held that a federal contractor cannot be held liable for conduct that the government has lawfully “authorized and directed” the contractor to perform. Instead, under the court’s decision, liability only attaches if the authorization was unlawful or if the contractor acted outside the scope of the government’s authorization.

After a federal judge denied GEO’s motion to dismiss, the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal, which the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed after granting the defendant’s petition for certiorari.

The court held that, because Yearsley provides federal contractors a potential defense on the merits instead of immunity from suit, a pretrial order denying Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable.

Click here to read the full text of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Feb. 25 decision in GEO Group, Inc v. Menocal.

“Once Yearsley is understood [as a merits defense,] the question before us almost answers itself: No, a district court’s denial of Yearsley protection is not immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. §1291, [which establishes jurisdiction in the courts of appeals in appeals from “final decisions” in the district court]. Like the denial of other defenses, such a ruling is not … “effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.” The right that a merits defense affords is to a finding of non-liability. And that right — unlike the right not to stand trial —is fully vindicable on appeal from a final judgment. All an appellate court need do at that point is reverse the erroneous liability finding. So the finality rule of §1291 precludes interlocutory review of a Yearsley denial.” — Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices Clarence Thomas (in part), Sonia Sotomayor, Neil M. Gorsuch, Brett M. Kavanaugh, Amy Coney Barrett and Ketanji Brown Jackson, opinion of the court

“I agree with the Court that [Yearsley] and similar decisions establish a defense from liability and not an immunity from suit. Orders rejecting Yearsley defenses are therefore unlike the orders denying immunities that this Court has already held to be immediately appealable. Because no other statute or rule authorized an interlocutory appeal here, the Court correctly affirms the Tenth Circuit’s dismissal. I do not join Part II because ‘[w]e need not, and in my view should not, further justify our holding by applying’ the collateral-order doctrine established by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). I remain of the view that we should not expand the Cohen collateral order doctrine beyond orders that our precedents have already held to be immediately appealable. — Justice Clarence Thomas, concurring in part and concurring in judgment

“I agree with the Court that the defense conferred by [Yearsley] is not an “immunity from suit.” I therefore agree that an order denying a Yearsley defense is not a ‘collateral order subject to immediate appeal. But I would not rest these conclusions solely on the fact that Yearsley‘s applicability ‘turn[s] on [the defendant’s] conduct’s legality.’ Under the collateral-order doctrine, defendants may sometimes appeal the denial of a defense immediately when doing so is necessary to vindicate important constitutional or public-policy interests. And this rule holds true even if the defense at issue turns on the legality of the defendant’s conduct. Thus, I cannot join the opinion of the Court, but I concur in the judgment because deferring appellate review of Yearsley rulings until final judgment does not imperil important constitutional or public-policy interests.” — Justice Samuel L. Alito, concurring in judgment

This website uses cookies, web beacons, pixels, tags, software development kits, and related tracking technologies, as described in our Privacy Policy and Cookie Policy, for purposes that may include website operation, analytics, analyzing site usage, enhancing site navigation optimizing a user's experience, and third-party advertising or marketing purposes. Through these technologies, we and certain third parties may automatically collect information about your interactions with our website, such as your browsing behavior and page views. We also may share this information about your activity on our website with our social media, advertising, analytics, and other business partners. By clicking “Accept All”, you consent to the use of these technologies and that we can share information about your activity on our website with third parties in accordance with our Privacy Policy and Cookie Policy. If you do not agree with our use of non-essential tracking technologies, please click “Reject All.” You may opt out of certain non-essential technologies by clicking “Cookie Settings.”

Functional Always active

The technical storage or access is strictly necessary for the legitimate purpose of enabling the use of a specific service explicitly requested by the subscriber or user, or for the sole purpose of carrying out the transmission of a communication over an electronic communications network.

Preferences

The technical storage or access is necessary for the legitimate purpose of storing preferences that are not requested by the subscriber or user.

Statistics

The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for statistical purposes.The technical storage or access that is used exclusively for anonymous statistical purposes. Without a subpoena, voluntary compliance on the part of your Internet Service Provider, or additional records from a third party, information stored or retrieved for this purpose alone cannot usually be used to identify you.

Advertisement

The technical storage or access is required to create user profiles to send advertising, or to track the user on a website or across several websites for similar marketing purposes.